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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
SETOFF. The debtor had obtained a loan from the
FmHA on which the debtor had defaulted pre-petition. The
debtor had also enrolled farm land in the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP). The FmHA notified the debtor of
its application to the ASCS to offset the debtor’s CRP
payments against the default on the debtor’s FmHA loan.
The offset was allowed and the debtor filed for Chapter 13.
The debtor assumed the CRP contract. The debtor argued
that the FmHA was not entitled to offset the CRP
payments in the bankruptcy case because the CRP contract
was executory and contingent upon the debtor’s
performance. In addition, the assumption of the contract
post-petition destroyed the mutuality between the pre- and
post-petition CRP contracts. The Bankruptcy Court had
agreed with the debtor, but the District Court held that the
filing of the bankruptcy case and assumption of the CRP
contract did not change the basic rights and obligations of
the parties and that the CRP payments could be offset
against the debtor’s debt to the FmHA. On remand, the
Bankruptcy Court held that setoff was not allowed because
the FmHA obligation was incurred pre-petition and the
CRP payments would occur post-petition. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the District Court decision was
the law of the case and controlled to allow the setoff. In re
Buckner, 218 B.R. 137 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1998), rev’g,
211 B.R. 46 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1997), on rem. from, 165
B.R. 942 (D. Kan. 1994), app. dismissed, 66 F.3d 263
(10th Cir. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. When the debtor failed to file income
tax returns for 1982 through 1988, the IRS prepared
substitute returns and assessed the debtor for the taxes
determined by those returns. The debtor then filed returns
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for those tax years which claimed a refund. The debtor’s
returns were filed more than three years before the debtor
filed for bankruptcy. The IRS argued that the debtor’s
filings were not returns for purposes of Section 523
because the IRS had already constructed the substitute
returns which have been held not to be returns for
purposes of Section 523. The IRS characterized the
debtor’s returns as amended returns or claims for refund
which were insufficient to trigger the discharge rules of
Section 523. The court held that the debtor’s returns were
valid returns, properly filed and sufficient to trigger the
three year period of Section 523 and to make the taxes
involved dischargeable. In re Savage, 218 B.R. 126
(Bankr. 10th Cir. 1998).
The debtors, husband and wife, filed for Chapter 13 on
April 9, 1993 and filed their 1992 return on April 15,
1993, showing taxes owed. The tax liability was listed as
an unsecured priority claim of the IRS. No proof of claim
was filed for the taxes and no payments were made under
the Chapter 13 plan. The debtors were granted a discharge
on April 14, 1996 after making all plan payments. The IRS
then collected the taxes by levy against wages and an
offset of a 1996 refund. The IRS argued that the 1992
taxes were a post-petition debt because the taxes, under
Section 1305(a)(1), did not become due and payable until
the 1992 tax return was filed. The court held that the 1992
taxes were a pre-petition debt, even though the return was
not due or filed until after the petition was filed. The court
held that the determination of whether a claim was post- or
pre-petition was made, not under Section 1305, but under
Section 101(5). The IRS claimed that it could not file a
proof of claim until the debtor filed an income tax return,
preventing the IRS from filing an accurate proof of claim
in the case. The court noted that the IRS would have up to
180 days after the filing of the petition to file a proof of
claim, well within sufficient time for a debtor to be
required to file a tax return. Therefore, the court held that,
even though the taxes were listed in the plan but were not
paid, the taxes were discharged because no proof of claim
was filed by the debtors or the IRS. In re Dixon, 218 B.R.
150 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1998), aff’g, 210 B.R. 610 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1997), aff’g on reconsid., 209 B.R. 535
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1997).
P L A N . The debtor had executed an installment
agreement with the IRS to pay back taxes. The agreement
would terminate if the debtor failed to make timely
payments, provide information or file timely income tax
returns.  The IRS filed secured, unsecured and priority tax
claims in the debtor’s Chapter 13 case, the total of which
would not be paid within five years under the installment
agreement. The debtor’s plan provided for payment of the
priority claim within the five years of the plan with the
remainder of the claims paid directly through the
installment agreement. Under the plan, there would be
nondischargeable taxes remaining to be paid at the end of
the plan. The court held that the plan was confirmable
under Section 1322(a)(2) because the installment
agreement had a maturity date after the end of the Chapter
13 plan. Matter of Gordon, 217 B.R. 973 (Bankr. S.D.
Ga. 1997).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The debtor had filed for
Chapter 7 and the trustee sold the debtor’s residence. The
trustee filed the estate’s income tax return and decreased
the proceeds from the sale by the amount of exemption
claimed by the debtor in bankruptcy. The trustee also
deducted the costs of sale before determining the taxable
gain from the sale. The court held that the bankruptcy
exemption amount was not excludible from the proceeds
of the sale for capital gains purposes. The trustee also
claimed a business expense for the legal and professional
expenses resulting from administration of the estate,
arguing that the trustee was in the business of
administering estates. The court held that the expenses
were not a business expense because the debtor was not in
the trade or business of administering estates. In re




BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has issued proposed
amendments to the brucellosis regulations concerning the
interstate movement of cattle by changing the
classification of Louisiana from Class Free to Class A. 63
Fed. Reg. 34264 (June 24, 1998).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
regulations which include the popcorn endorsement in the
Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1998 and earlier crop years. 63
Fed. Reg. 33835 (June 22, 1998).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which include
the quota tobacco Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions to
1998 and earlier crop years. 63 Fed. Reg. 34778 (June 26,
1998).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which include
the guaranteed tobacco Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions to
1997 and earlier crop years. 63 Fed. Reg. 34549 (June 25,
1998).
HORSES. The APHIS has adopted as final amendments
to the regulations pertaining to livestock facilities under
state or federal veterinary supervision to require that any
livestock facility accepting horses classified as reactors to
equine infectious anemia must quarantine these animals at
all times at least 200 yards from all equines that are not
reactors to this disease. Previously, livestock facilities
accepting reactors to equine infectious anemia were
required to quarantine the reactors that will remain at the
facility for longer than 24 hours at least 200 yards away
from all other animals. 63 Fed. Reg. 32117 (June 12,
1998).
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations concerning animals destroyed because of
tuberculosis to provide for the payment of federal
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indemnity to owners of cattle, bison, and captive cervids
that have been classified as suspects for tuberculosis and
have been destroyed, when it has been determined by the
APHIS that the destruction of the suspect animals will
contribute to the tuberculosis eradication program in U.S.
livestock. The interim regulations also allow the U.S.
Department of Agriculture to pay herd owners some of
their expenses for transporting the suspect cattle, bison,
and captive cervids to slaughter or to the point of disposal,
and for disposing of the animals. Prior to this interim rule,
owners of cattle, bison, and captive cervids could only
receive federal indemnity for affected and exposed animals
destroyed because of tuberculosis, and animals in an
affected herd destroyed as part of a herd depopulation.
Indemnity for suspects will provide incentive for owners
to promptly destroy suspect animals, thereby hastening the
diagnosis of tuberculosis in a herd. 63 Fed. Reg. 34259
(June 24, 1998).
CONTRACTS
AGENCY. The plaintiff was an onion grower which
thought that it had a contract with the defendant, under
which the defendant would sell the onions grown by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, dealt with two or three
individuals who the plaintiff thought were agents of the
defendant. The onions were shipped in bags with another
company’s logo on them. The plaintiff was paid for some
of the onions but was suing for the remaining payment.
The trial court had granted the defendant a directed verdict
because there was no evidence that the defendant had
given apparent authority to the individuals who dealt with
the plaintiff. The individuals had represented that they
were agents of the defendant but the plaintiff presented no
evidence that the defendant had authorized the individuals
to act as agents or had showed a lack of ordinary care in
order to clothe the agent with an indicia of authority. The
court upheld the trial court’s directed verdict for the
defendant. Sociedad De Solaridad Social v. McManus
Produce Co., 964 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ANNUITY. The decedent had owned four parcels of
farmland which were originally intended to pass to the
decedent’s grandchildren by testamentary bequest. The
decedent decided, however, to sell the parcels to the
grandchildren in exchange for an annuity. The decedent
executed the documents for the transfer prior to April 30,
1989 (the effective date of I.R.C. § 7520) but title did not
pass until after that date when the grandchildren signed the
annuity agreement. The decedent’s accountant valued the
annuity using tables which were not effective under
Section 7520 and used too low an interest rate, whereas the
accountant should have used the procedures in Notice 89-
24, 1989-1 C.B. 660. As a result the annuity amount was
too low to make the value of the annuity equal the fair
market value of the farmland transferred. The court held
that the difference between the fair market value of the
farmland and the value of the annuity was a taxable gift
from the decedent. As part of the transfer, the decedent
required the grandchildren to contribute their interests in
the land to a family partnership which provided that other
partners would have a first option to purchase any interest
in the land to be sold. The estate argued that the
partnership arrangement made the transfer a business
transaction exempt from the gift tax. The court held that
the transfer was not a business transaction because no
arm’s-length negotiations took place to determine the
details of the transfer. Est. of Cullison v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-216.
DISCLAIMERS. The taxpayer was a contingent
remainder holder in a trust which had the taxpayer’s parent
as the current income beneficiary. The taxpayer learned
about the interest prior to the parent’s death. Under state
law a taker of property can disclaim a future interest in
property within nine months after the event determining
that the taker of the property or interest is finally
ascertained and the taker's interest is indefeasibly vested.
However, the right to disclaim is barred by a transfer of
the interest or a contract for transfer, a written waiver of
the right to disclaim, an acceptance of the interest or a
benefit from it, or a judicial sale occurring before the
disclaimer is made. The ruling does not state when the
disclaimer took place, but the taxpayer disclaimed any
interest in the trust after the death of the parent. The IRS
ruled that the disclaimer was effective because it occurred
within a reasonable time after the taxpayer learned about
the contingent interest in the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9823041,
March 9, 1998.
The decedent was preceded in death by a spouse who left
the entire estate to the decedent. The decedent discussed a
disclaimer of the inheritance with attorneys but did not
execute a written disclaimer before death. The decedent’s
heirs petitioned a state court which ruled that the decedent
intended to make the disclaimer and ruled that the
predeceased spouse’s estate passed as if the disclaimer was
made. The District Court ruled that the disclaimer was not
effective for federal estate tax purposes because there was
no written disclaimer and state law did not provide for
disclaimers by the heirs of an heir. The appellate court
reversed, holding that state law did allow heirs to file
disclaimers for a decedent. Delaune v. U.S., 98-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. ¶60,316 (5th Cir. 1998), rev’g, 79 AFTR2d ¶
97-618 (M.D. La. 1997).
GIFT. The decedent had owned voting stock in a family
corporation. The decedent had transferred 50 percent of
the voting stock to the corporation in exchange for the
same amount of nonvoting stock at the same time that the
decedent’s two children’s nonvoting stock was exchanged
for voting stock. Each child exchanged 25 percent of the
total corporation stock. The decedent’s estate argued that
no gift occurred because the voting rights in the stock had
no separate value. The court disagreed, holding that the
determination of a gift depended on the difference in value
of the stock, not the separate value of the voting rights.
The gift was valued as two separate gifts of 25 percent of
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the corporation’s stock and not as one gift of 50 percent of
the voting stock in exchange for 50 percent of the
nonvoting stock. Estate of Bosca v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-251.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* T h e
decedent and surviving spouse were beneficiaries of a
revocable inter vivos trust. The trust provided for passing
of trust assets to the survivor in trust, with a portion of the
assets passing to a marital trust sufficient to reduce the
estate tax to zero. However, the trust provided that either
the spouse’s interest in income, principal or any power of
appointment terminated upon the spouse’s incompetency.
The court held that the incompetency contingency made
the surviving spouse’s interest too contingent to qualify
the spouse’s interest in the trust as QTIP; therefore, the
property passing to the surviving spouse’s interest in the
marital trust was not eligible for the marital deduction.
Est. of Walsh v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. No. 29 (1998).
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED POWERS-ALM §
5.02[3].* The decedent and spouse had transferred land to
an Illinois land trust and initially held a 50 percent interest
in the trust. The trust provided that the “trustee on written
direction of any combination of at least three (but not more
than all) beneficiaries possessing at least two-thirds of the
beneficial interest herein, or such other person or at least
three (but not more than all) beneficiaries possessing at
least two-thirds of the beneficial interest herein, make
deeds for, mortgage or otherwise deal with the title to said
real estate.” The decedent made several inter vivos
transfers of portions of the decedent’s interest in the trust
and the decedent’s estate excluded these transferred
interests from the decedent’s estate. The IRS argued that
Estate of Bowgren v. Comm’r, 105 F.3d 1156 (7th Cir.
1997)  controlled as precedent to require that the
transferred interests were included in the decedent’s gross
estate because the decedent retained an interest in the
transferred interests. In Bowgren , the decedent had
retained the sole authority to allow the trustee to transfer
trust assets. In this case, the court followed Bowgren and
Adolphson v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,048
(C.D. Ill. 1990) and held that the trust assets were
includible in the decedent’s gross estate because the
decedent, in conjunction with less than all beneficiaries,
had the authority to require the trustee to transfer trust
assets. Swain v. U.S., 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,313 (7th Cir. 1998), aff’g on point, 969 F. Supp. 515
(C.D. Ill. 1997).
TRUSTS. The taxpayer created an 18-year trust and
transferred property to the trust which included a
residence, guest house, two detached garages, a boathouse,
two sheds, and a pond. The taxpayer used the property as a
weekend and vacation residence. The property constituted
a watershed area for the pond and surrounding streams.
The deed for the parcel that was transferred to the trust
included substantial restrictions with respect to the
subdivision of the property. The restrictions were placed
on the property because of concerns that subdivision and
development would disrupt the natural waterflow in the
region. The taxpayer also applied for certification of the
land as forestland in order to obtain a lower real property
tax on the property. The certification required submission
of a forest management plan. If the taxpayer survives the
18-year term of the trust and continues to use or possess
the residence after the death of the taxpayer's spouse, the
taxpayer represented that the taxpayer will pay fair market
value rental for the periods of time for which the taxpayer
has use or possession of the property. The IRS ruled that,
if the taxpayer pays fair market value rental for these
periods of use or possession, assuming that there was no
express or implied understanding that the taxpayer may
retain use of the property whether or not rent is paid, the
taxpayer's continued use of the property would not result
in the inclusion of the property in the taxpayer’s gross
estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a). The IRS also ruled that the
property was a qualified personal residence. Ltr. Rul.
9827037, April 6, 1998.
VALUATION. The decedent owned unregistered
voting stock in a corporation in which the decedent was an
affiliate under federal securities law. The stock was subject
to federal security law restrictions on the sale of the stock
during the decedent’s life but the restrictions did not apply
to the decedent’s estate. The estate argued that the stock
should be valued for estate tax purposes with a discount
for the restrictions in effect during the decedent’s life. The
Tax Court ruled that the valuation was to be determined by
reference to the interest which passed by reason of the
decedent’s death; therefore, because the stock passed to
the estate without the restrictions, no discount for the
restrictions could be applied to the value of the stock. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the change in value
occurred not solely upon the decedent’s death but only
after the stock was transferred to the estate which was not
an affiliate; therefore, the value of the stock was
determined with the restrictions based on the decedent’s
status as an affiliate. Estate of McClatchy v. Comm’r,
98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,315 (9th Cir. 1998),
rev’g, 106 T.C. 206 (1996).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES . The taxpayer had self-
employment income from sales of insurance and
securities. The taxpayer claimed travel expenses from
hiring a pilot and a private plane and for automobile
expenses. The taxpayer also claimed meals and
entertainment expenses. The taxpayer did not keep a
contemporaneous log of the expenses listing the purpose
of the expense, the time and place of the expense and the
business relationship to the person entertained. The
taxpayer only had receipts and some reconstructed records
to substantiate the expenses. The court upheld the IRS
disallowance of much of the claimed expenses as
unsubstantiated. Hentges v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-
244.
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT. The taxpayers operated
a cattle ranch and sold some cattle in exchange for a check
in 1986. Apparently the check was lost in the mail when
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the taxpayer sent the check to the bank for the deposit. In
1988. the missing payment was discovered during an IRS
audit and the cattle buyer reissued the check. The
taxpayers included the check amount in income for 1988
but the IRS assessed a deficiency after including the check
amount in income for 1986. The court held that the
doctrine of constructive receipt included the check in
income when the check was received by the taxpayer and
not when the check is honored by the bank. Walter v.
U.S., No. 96-3828 (8th Cir. 1998).
CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer owned
rural land and leased a portion of the land to a corporation
owned by the taxpayer. The corporation built a building on
the land which involved an open first floor with no
facilities and a second floor which contained four
bedrooms and four full bathrooms. The taxpayer and
family lived in the second floor area. The rent paid by the
corporation exceeded the fair market rental for the
property and was not paid by the corporation. The lease
also required the corporation to pay all taxes associated
with the leased property but the taxpayer personally made
these payments. The corporation maintained a separate site
which was used for business operations. The court held
that the corporation’s rent and construction payments were
constructive dividends to the taxpayer. Spera v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1998-225.
CONTRIBUTIONS. The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder of a corporation which built houses. The
taxpayer paid off a corporation loan with personal property
in exchange for an unsecured demand note. The note
required no interest and had no repayment terms. During
the next four years, the corporation build no houses
because of a slump in the housing business. Five years
later, the corporation paid the taxpayer a sum of money
which the corporation and the taxpayer treated as a
repayment of the loan. The court held that the original loan
to the corporation was a contribution to capital because no
lender would have made a loan to the corporation without
security, repayment terms or interest. The court noted that
the corporation was unlikely to require repayment because
the taxpayer controlled the corporation. The appellate
decision is designated as not for publication. Bowman v.
Comm’r, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,498 (4th Cir.
1998), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1997-52.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer had sued a construction company for fraud,
conspiracy and breach of contract arising out of a contract
to make repairs to the taxpayer’s house. The jury awarded
over $6 million to the taxpayer, of which $153,000 was for
compensatory damages and $6 million was for punitive
damages. The lawsuit was filed on May 11, 1989 and the
jury award was paid in 1992. The court held that the
amendment to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) which was enacted in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA 1989),
Pub. L. 101-239, sec. 7641(a), 103 Stat. 2106 (1989)
stated that the amendment did not apply to lawsuits filed
before July 10, 1989; therefore, the amendment did not
apply in this case and the punitive damage award was
included in the taxpayer’s income. However, the court also
held that the award was to be decreased by the amount of
attorney’s fees paid out of the award. The IRS had argued
that the attorney’s fees should have been treated as an
itemized miscellaneous deduction. Davis v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1998-248.
After the taxpayer resigned from employment with a
company the taxpayer filed suit against the employer for
breach of contract, destruction of the taxpayer’s equity in
the taxpayer’s sales territory, failure to pay wages under
Connecticut law, unlawful deductions from wages in
violation of Connecticut law, conversion, and constructive
discharge. There was no claim for damages for personal or
emotional injury. The employer made a settlement offer to
pay for the lost commissions and equity but allowed the
taxpayer to write the language of the settlement terms. The
settlement amount was allocated only to payment for the
wrongful discharge action and for attorney’s fees. The
agreement also provided that the taxpayer would
compensate the employer for any adverse tax
consequences from the settlement allocation. The
employer claimed the settlement as a compensation
expense. The court held that the settlement in substance
was for lost commissions and was not excludable from the
taxpayer’s income. Hess v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-
240.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-ALM §
4.02[15].*  Collection agencies have used the following
technique as a form of debtor intimidation. The agency
informs the debtor that if the debt is not paid, the agency
will write-off the debt and file a Form 1099 reporting the
debt write-off as discharge of indebtedness income to the
debtor. The IRS stated that there is no requirement that a
creditor file a Form 1099 for past-due accounts unless the
creditor and debtor reach an agreement to cancel a debt.
The IRS also stated that it had no clear solution to abuse of
the Form 1099 process by collection agencies. The IRS
noted that the mere filing of the Form 1099 was not
conclusive that any discharge of indebtedness occurred
because the agency could revoke the filing once the debtor
paid the debt. FSA 1992-0825-1.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayer was
employed as an airline pilot and also worked as an
accountant part time. The taxpayer purchased two horses
to train them as polo horses for resale to polo players. One
horse was never trained and the other proved to be unfit
for polo play. The court held that the taxpayer could not
deduct expenses associated with the horse training
activities in excess of income because(1) the taxpayer's
experience in training horses ever involved more than use
of them for personal recreation.; (2) the taxpayer spent
only a few hours each week on the activity and that part of
this time was spent demonstrating the taxpayer’s
competence as a polo player; and (3) the taxpayer never
made the kind of commitment to the activity that would
have given the activity a reasonable chance to make a
profit. Romer v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-238.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in May 1998,
the weighted average is 6.59 percent with the permissible
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range of 5.93 to 6.99 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 5.93 to 7.25 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice
98-33, I.R.B. 1998-25, 10.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
July 1998
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.56 5.48 5.44 5.42
110% AFR 6.12 6.03 5.99 5.96
120% AFR 6.69 6.58 6.53 6.49
Mid-term
AFR 5.68 5.60 5.56 5.54
110% AFR 6.25 6.16 6.11 6.08
120% AFR 6.83 6.72 6.66 6.63
Long-term
AFR 5.88 5.80 5.76 5.73
110% AFR 6.48 6.38 6.33 6.30
120% AFR 7.08 6.96 6.90 6.86
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
BUILT-IN GAINS. An C corporation leased timber land
and had income from cutting and processing logs for sale
and from a contract under which another company cut the
logs and paid stumpage value to the corporation. The
corporation receives payments under the contract based
only on the number of logs actually cut, based on a yearly
minimum. The corporation made an election under I.R.C.
§ 631(a) to treat the cutting of the timber as a sale or
exchange of the timber. The corporation planned to make
the S corporation election. The IRS ruled that the income
from the timber cut and sold during the recognition period
was not subject to the built-in gains tax under I.R.C. §
1374. Ltr. Rul. 9825018, March 19, 1998.
DISTRIBUTIONS. An S corporation had an
accumulated earnings account during a tax year in which it
made distributions to the shareholders. The corporation did
not make an election, under I.R.C. § 1368(e)(3)(A), to
reverse the order of treating distributions as coming first
from the accumulated earnings account rather than first
from earnings and profits. The corporation’s and some
shareholders’ tax returns were not completely consistent
with the corporation’s failure to make the election and the
IRS argued that the corporation substantially complied
with the election requirements required to treat the election
as having been made. The court held that the inconsistent
filing was insufficient to overcome the corporation’s intent
not to file the election. The court did not rule on the issue
of whether the substantial compliance doctrine could be
used to require a taxpayer to make an election against the
taxpayer’s intent. Thurman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1998-233.
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer,
corporation owned and operated several residential
duplexes. The corporation was owned by a revocable trust
which provided rental related services on behalf of the
corporation to the duplexes. The services included
interviewing prospective tenants, negotiating and signing
leases, issuing monthly rent bills, collecting the rents, and
personally dealing with tenants regarding violations of
lease terms. The trust also resolved tenant complaints,
handled repairs, renovations, cleaning and maintenance,
and arranged for inspections relating to roofs, furnaces,
and air conditioners. The trust hired third parties to
provide tax preparation, legal, and certain maintenance or
repair services for the corporation. The IRS ruled that the
rental income to the corporation from the duplexes was not
passive investment income. Ltr. Rul. 9823011, March 3,
1998.
SALE OF INTEREST. The taxpayer had owned a one-
third interest in an S corporation. After disagreements
occurred among the shareholders, the taxpayer executed an
agreement with the other shareholders on January 12,
1989, which allowed either the taxpayer to purchase the
other shareholders’ interests or, after eight months, the
other shareholders would purchase the taxpayer’s interest.
On June 30, 1990, the other shareholders purchased the
taxpayer’s interest. The taxpayer did not include any share
of the corporation’s income in the taxpayer’s income for
the period from January 12, 1989 to June 30, 1990. The
taxpayer argued that the taxpayer had no beneficial interest
in the corporation during that time. The court found that
the taxpayer participated in management of the corporation
during the period involved and that, although the taxpayer
received no distributions during that time, no shareholder
received a distribution during that time. Therefore, the
court held that the taxpayer’s interest in the corporation
terminated on June 30, 1990 and the corporation income
during the period was taxable to the taxpayer. McMichael
v. U.S., 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶ 50,536 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
SUBSIDIARIES. An S corporation formed a subsidiary
corporation to operate a manufacturing business purchased
from a third party. The S corporation failed to timely file a
Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary election and requested
an extension to file the election. The IRS allowed the
extension. Ltr. Rul. 9825028, March 23, 1998.
TRUSTS. An S corporation sought a ruling that allowed
it to revoke the QSST election of trust shareholders and to
make an election to have the trusts trreated as electing
small business trusts (ESBT). The IRS ruled: (1) in order
for a trust to qualify as an ESBT, the trust cannot have a
QSST election in place; (2) a QSST election may be
revoked only with the consent of the Secretary; (3) Rev.
Proc. 98-23, I.R.B. 1998-10, 5  grants the consent of the
Secretary to revoke a QSST election for a trust that
converts to an ESBT; therefore, (4) no letter ruling from
the I.R.S. was required to revoke the QSST election and to
make the ESBT election. By following the requirements of
Rev. Proc. 98-23, the trusts will receive the consent of the
Secretary to revoke their QSST elections. Rev. Proc. 98-23
also provided that, for purposes of I.R.C. § 1377(a), the
QSST would be treated as terminating its interest in the S
corporation and the new ESBT would be treated as a new
shareholder of the S corporation. The last day the QSST
would be a shareholder was the day before the effective
date of the ESBT election, and the new ESBT would be a
shareholder beginning on the effective date of the ESBT
election. The conversion of the trust from a QSST to an
ESBT would not affect the S corporation status of the S
corporations in which the trust holds stock. Ltr. Rul.
9824007, March 9, 1998; Ltr. Rul. 9824008, March 9,
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1998; Ltr. Rul. 9824010, March 9, 1998; Ltr. Rul.
9824011, March 9, 1998.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The facts in this case occurred
prior to the exclusion of gain from the sale of a residence
in the 1997 Tax Act. The taxpayer purchased a new
residence in November 1985 and sold the prior residence
in December 1986. In August 1988, the taxpayer
purchased a condominium which was used by the taxpayer
as the principal residence. The second residence was sold
in April 1990. The taxpayer treated the gain from the sale
of the first residence as deferred under I.R.C. § 1034 and
the sale of the second residence as deferred under the same
rule. The court held that, because the third residence was
purchased within two years after the sale of the first
residence, only the third residence was eligible for the
deferral of gain from the sale of the first residence. The
court held that the gain realized on the sale of the first
residence did not reduce the adjusted basis of the second
residence and the difference between the cost of the
second residence and the sale proceeds was recognized
gain to the taxpayer. Asher v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1998-219.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME. The taxpayer was a
grain farmer who also raised laying hens. The taxpayer
enrolled a portion of the cropland in the federal
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The taxpayer did
not include the CRP payments in self-employment income,
arguing that the CRP payments were rental income. The
IRS argued, citing Ray v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-436,
that the CRP payments were self-employment income
because the CRP contract was connected to the taxpayer’s
use of the entire property for farming. The court held that
the CRP payments were rental income because the
payments were designated as rent by the government. Neil
Harl will publish an article on this case in the next issue of
the Digest. Wuebker v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. No. 31
(1998).
SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION EXPENSES.
The taxpayer was a foreign partnership required to file
U.S. federal income tax returns. The partnership owned
and operated farms in Australia and had soil and water
conservation expenses on the farms. The partnership was
allowed to deduct, under I.R.C. § 175, these expenses
incurred before December 31, 1986. The IRS argued that
Section 175, as modified by the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 401(a), 100 Stat. 2221, which added
section 175(c)(3), no longer applied to conservation
expenditures incurred with respect to land located outside
the United States. The court agreed and disallowed the
deduction for land located in Australia. Koramba
Farmers & Graziers No. 1, 110 T.C. No. 33 (1998).
THEFT LOSS. The taxpayer claimed to have purchased
mining equipment and to have lost the equipment due to
theft. The taxpayer claimed to have left the equipment at
the remote mining site covered by a tarpaulin for at least a
year before returning to discover its loss. The taxpayer
provided no evidence of the purchase price of any
equipment or other evidence of the equipment’s existence
except the taxpayer’s testimony. The court held that no
loss deduction was allowed because the taxpayer did not
provide evidence of the equipment’s cost or other tax
basis. Richardson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-236.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
LEASE. The plaintiffs had entered into irrigated crop
land leases with one defendant. The defendant terminated
the leases after the second year after the irrigation water
became contaminated (see case summary infra under
Nuisance) and the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract.
The defendant argued that the leases were invalid because
the leases were not acknowledged. The court held that the
two years of performance by both parties was sufficient to
demonstrate that the parties acknowledged the leases.
Tiegs v. Watts, 954 P.2d 877 (Wash. 1998).
PROPERTY
TRAILS. The defendant acquired a former railroad
right-of-way over which it intended to operate a
recreational trail. The train rails were removed. The
plaintiff owned land along the trail and sought to enjoin
the use of the right-of-way as a trail because the trail had
no fence along it in violation of Wis. Stat. § 192.33 which
required railroads to maintain a fence along roads in the
right-of-way. The court held that the statute applied only
to owners who operated a railroad on the right-of-way and
did not include owners who used the right-of-way road for
any other purpose. May v. Tri-County Trails
Commission, No. 97-0588, 1998 WL 334811 (Wis. Ct.
App. June 25, 1998).
NUISANCE
UNDERGROUND WATER CONTAMINATION.
The defendant operated a paper mill and obtained a permit
to treat and discharge waste water from the mill. The other
defendant purchased neighboring land and leased it as
potato crop land to the plaintiffs. The owner installed
circle rotation irrigation systems on the property using
water from wells drilled on the property. Although the first
crops were fine, the second crops were damaged by
contaminants in the water, allegedly from the mill waste
water treatment facility discharges. When the
contamination became known, the defendants terminated
the leases. A jury verdict found that the contamination
came from the mill wastes, the contamination was a
nuisance, and damages were awarded for the lost profits to
the plaintiffs. The defendants argued that the
contamination could not be a nuisance because the waste
discharges were pursuant to a governmental permit and
that a nuisance could result only if the waste discharge
violated the permit. The court upheld the jury verdict,
holding that, although a waste discharge may be permitted,
the waste discharge was an actionable nuisance if it caused
damage to neighboring property rights. Tiegs v. Watts,
954 P.2d 877 (Wash. 1998).
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FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 4-8, 1999
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1999! Balmy trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand
beaches and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business
Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A. McEowen.  The seminar is scheduled for January 4-8,
1999 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Waikoloan Resort on the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with a
continental breakfast and break refreshments included in the registration fee.  Each participant will
receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 430 page seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated
Materials which will be updated just prior to the seminar.
     Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business
deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to
minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and
"hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales,
private annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts and medicaid trusts
.  • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient flights
at a busy travel time of the year. Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the
Royal Waikoloan Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the
Agricultural Law Manual., or Principles of Agricultural Law The registration fee for nonsubscribers is
$695.
Subscribers should have received a brochure in the mail. Call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-
1958 if you have not yeet received one.
